United Federated Planets Uniform Code of Military Justice

Punitive Articles of the UCMJ
Articles 77 - 134. Includes the text of the offense, explanations, maximum punishments, and sample specifications.

Punitive Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is the bedrock of military law. The UCMJ is a federal law, enacted by Congress. Articles 77 through 134 of the UCMJ are known as the "punitive offenses," -- that is, specific offenses which, if violated, can result in punishment by court-martial.

The law authorizes the Commander-in-Chief (The President of the United Federated Planets) to implement the provisions of the UCMJ. The President does this via an executive order known as the "Manual for Court Martial" (MCM). The MCM includes, and expands on the punitive articles. The MCM divides the punitive articles into six parts: The text, elements of the offense, an explanation, lesser included offenses, maximum permissible punishments, and sample specifications.

The Text: This is the exact text of the article, as Congress approved it in the UCMJ.

Elements: These are the specifics of the offense. In order to support a finding of "guilty," the government must prove each and every element of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Explanation: The explanation defines terms, and clarifies the elements, based on previous court decisions.

Lesser Included Offense: These are lesser offenses that a military court may still find an accused guilty of, even if the court finds the accused not guilty of the originally charged offense. For example, "Manslaughter," under Article 119 is a lesser included offense of "Murder," under Article 118. If a military court finds the accused not guilty of the crime of Murder, the court can still find the accused guilty of Manslaughter, without the government having to amend the charges.

Maximum Permissible Punishments: These are the *maximum* punishments that a general court martial can award toward a particular offense. While not specifically stated, a general court martial can also reduce a person's grade. Most general court martials reduce the convicted person's grade to the lowest enlisted rank (E-1) when punishment includes time in prison and/or a punitive discharge.

Sample Specifications: These are samples of how the charges would be written when referred to court martial.

NOTE 1: This Uniform Code of Military Justice has been implemented to add realism to the enjoyment of the United Federated Planets members who have selected the United Federated Planets military forces to serve in and enjoy. All of this is for role playing and is, therefore, not to be deemed as an actual document to be enforced by any authority. There are other guidelines in specific United Federated Planets documents that do pertain to personal behavior by United Federated Planets members at official United Federated Planets functions and activities, which are enforceable by United Federated Planets Chapter Presidents and are upheld by the United Federated Planets, Incorporated as the sponsor for the United Federated Planets fan club. So enjoy your selected fan interests.

NOTE 2: For the purposes of the United Federated Planets military forces, any offense against another person which is deemed a FELONY OFFENCE in the state or country in which the criminal act occurs shall be tried by a court of that state or country and during said trial, the United Federated Planets arrested and tried for said FELONY OFFENCE shall be placed on administrative membership leave until a verdict is returned concerning said FELONY OFFENCE.  If the United Federated Planets member is found guilty of said FELONY OFFENCE, then said United Federated Planets member shall be removed from the official United Federated Planets membership roster and if said United Federated Planets member is found NOT GUILTY of said FELONY OFFENCE, said United Federated Planets member shall retain their United Federated Planets lifetime membership.

Article 77—Principals

4.1.1 a. Text.

"Any person punishable under this chapter who--

(1) commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures its commission; or

(2) causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be punishable by this chapter. is a principal."

4.1.2 b. Explanation.

1) Purpose. Article 77 does not define an offense. Its purpose is to make clear that a person need not personally perform the acts necessary to constitute an offense to be guilty of it. A person who aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures the commission of an offense, or who causes an act to be done which, if done by that person directly, would be an offense is equally guilty of the offense as one who commits it directly, and may be punished to the same extent.

Article 77 eliminates the common law distinctions between principal in the first degree (“perpetrator"); principal in the second degree (one who aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the commission of an offense and who is present at the scene of the crime--commonly known as an "aider and abettor"); and accessory before the fact (one who aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the commission of an offense and who is not present at the scene of the crime). All of these are now "principals."

(2) Who may be liable for an offense.

(a) Perpetrator. A perpetrator is one who actually commits the offense, either by the perpetrator's own hand, or by causing an offense to be committed by knowingly or intentionally inducing or setting in motion acts by an animate or inanimate agency or instrumentality which result in the commission of an offense. For example, a person who knowingly conceals contraband drugs in an automobile, and then induces another person, who is unaware and has no reason to know of the presence of drugs, to drive the automobile onto a military installation, is, although not present in the automobile, guilty of wrongful introduction of drugs onto a military installation. (On these facts, the driver would be guilty of no crime.) Similarly, if, upon orders of a superior, a soldier shot a person who appeared to the soldier to be an enemy, but was known to the superior as a friend, the superior would be guilty of murder (but the soldier would be guilty of no offense).

(b) Other Parties. If one is not a perpetrator, to be guilty of an offense committed by the perpetrator, the person must:

(I) Assist, encourage, advise, instigate, counsel, command, or procure another to commit, or assist, encourage, advise, counsel, or command another in the commission of the offense; and

(ii) Share in the criminal purpose of design.

One who, without knowledge of the criminal venture or plan, unwittingly encourages or renders assistance to another in the commission of an offense is not guilty of a crime. See the parentheticals in the examples in paragraph 1b(2)(a) above. In some circumstances, inaction may make one liable as a party, where there is a duty to act. If a person (for example, a security guard) has a duty to interfere in the commission of an offense, but does not interfere, that person is a party to the crime if such a noninterference is intended to and does operate as an aid or encouragement to the actual perpetrator.

(3) Presence.

(a) Not necessary. Presence at the scene of the crime is not necessary to make one a party to the crime and liable as a principal. For example, one who, knowing that person intends to shoot another person and intending that such an assault be carried out, provides the person with a pistol, is guilty of assault when the offense is committed, even though not present at the scene.

(b) Not sufficient. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make one a principal unless the requirements of paragraph 1b(2)(a) or (b) have been met.

(4) Parties whose intent differs from the perpetrator's. When an offense charged requires proof of a specific intent or particular state of mind as an element, the evidence must prove that the accused had that intent or state of mind, whether the accused is charged as a perpetrator or an "other party" to crime. It is possible for a party to have a state of mind more or less culpable than the perpetrator of the offense. In such a case, the party may be guilty of a more or less serious offense than that committed by the perpetrator. For example, when a homicide is committed, the perpetrator may act in the heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation and be guilty of manslaughter, while the party who, without such passion, hands the perpetrator a weapon and encourages the perpetrator to kill the victim, would be guilty of murder. On the other hand, if a party assists a perpetrator in an assault on a person who, known only to the perpetrator, is an officer, the party would be guilty only of assault, while the perpetrator would be guilty of assault on an officer.

(5) Responsibility for other crimes. A principal may be convicted of crimes committed by another principal if such crimes are likely to result as a natural and probable consequence of the criminal venture or design. For example, the accused who is a party to a burglary is guilty as a principal not only of the offense of burglary, but also, if the perpetrator kills an occupant in the course of the burglary, of murder. (See also paragraph 5 concerning liability for offenses committed by co-conspirators.)

(6) Principals independently liable. One may be a principal, even if the perpetrator is not identified or prosecuted, or is acquitted.

(7) Withdrawal. A person may withdraw from a common venture or design and avoid liability for any offenses committed after the withdrawal. To be effective, the withdrawal must meet the following requirements:

(a) It must occur before the offense is committed;

(b) The assistance, encouragement, advice, instigation, counsel, command, or procurement given by the person must be effectively countermanded or negated; and

(c) The withdrawal must be clearly communicated to the would-be perpetrators or to appropriate law enforcement authorities in time for the perpetrators to abandon the plan or for law enforcement authorities to prevent the offense.

Article 78—Accessory after the fact

4.2.1 a. Text.
"Any person subject to this chapter who, knowing that an offense punishable by this chapter has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.2.2 b. Elements.
(1) That an offense punishable by the code was committed by a certain person;

(2) That the accused knew that this person had committed such offense;

(3) That thereafter the accused received, comforted, or assisted the offender; and

(4) That the accused did so for the purpose of hindering or preventing the apprehension, trial, or punishment of the offender.

(1) In general. The assistance given a principal by an accessory after the fact is not limited to assistance designed to effect the escape or concealment of the principal, but also includes acts performed to conceal the commission of the offense by the principal (for example, by concealing evidence of the offense).

(2) Failure to report offense. The mere failure to report a known offense will not make one an accessory after the fact. Such failure may violate a general order or regulation, however, and thus constitute an offense under Article 92. See paragraph 16. If the offense involved is a serious offense, failure to report it may constitute the offense of misprision of a serious offense, under Article 134. See paragraph 95.

(3) Offense punishable by the code. The term "offense punishable by this chapter" in the text of the article means any offense described in the code.

(4) Status of principal. The principal who committed the offense in question need not be subject to the code, but the offense committed must be punishable by the code.

(5) Conviction or acquittal of principal. The prosecution must prove that a principal committed the offense to which the accused is allegedly an accessory after the fact. However, evidence of the conviction or acquittal of the principal in a separate trial is not admissible to show that the principal did or did not commit the offense. Furthermore, an accused may be convicted as an accessory after the fact despite the acquittal in a separate trial of the principal whom the accused allegedly comforted, received, or assisted.

(6) Accessory after the fact not a lesser included offense. The offense of being an accessory after the fact is not a lesser included offense of the primary offense.

(7) Actual knowledge. Actual knowledge is required but may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

4.2.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80- attempts

4.2.5 e. Maximum punishment.
Any person subject to the code who is found guilty as an accessory after the fact to an offense punishable by the code shall be subject to the maximum punishment authorized for the principal offense, except that in no case shall the death penalty nor more than one-half of the maximum confinement authorized for that offense be adjudged, nor shall the period of confinement exceed 10 years in any case, including offenses for which life imprisonment may be adjudged.

4.2.6 f. Sample specification.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), knowing that (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , __________ had committed an offense punishable by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to wit: __________ , did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19 __________ , in order to (hinder) (prevent) the (apprehension) (trial) (punishment) of the said __________ , (receive) (comfort) (assist) the said __________ by __________ .

Article 79—Conviction of lesser included offenses

4.3.1 a. Text.
"An accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein."

4.3.2 b. Explanation.

(1) In general.:

A lesser offense is included in a charged offense when the specification contains allegations which either expressly or by fair implication put the accused on notice to be prepared to defend against it in addition to the offense specifically charged. This requirement of notice may be met when:

(a) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and the common elements are identical (for example, larceny as a lesser included offense of robbery);

(b) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, but one or more elements is legally less serious (for example, housebreaking as a lesser included offense of burglary); or

(c) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included and necessary parts of the greater offense, but the mental element is legally less serious (for example, wrongful appropriation as a lesser included offense of larceny).

The notice requirement may also be met, depending on the allegations in the specification, even though an included offense requires proof of an element not required in the offense charged. For example, assault with a dangerous weapon may be included in a robbery.

(2) Multiple lesser included offenses.:

When the offense charged is a compound offense comprising two or more included offenses, an accused may be found guilty of any or all of the offenses included in the offense charged. For example, robbery includes both larceny and assault. Therefore, in a proper case, a court-martial may find an accused not guilty of robbery, but guilty of wrongful appropriation and assault.

(3) Findings of guilty to a lesser included offense.:

A court-martial may find an accused not guilty of the offense charged, but guilty of a lesser included offense by the process of exception and substitution. The court-martial may except (that is, delete) the words in the specification that pertain to the offense charged and, if necessary, substitute language appropriate to the lesser included offense. For example, the accused is charged with murder in violation of Article 118, but found guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of Article 119. Such a finding may be worded as follows:

Of the Specification: Guilty, except the word "murder," substituting therefore the words "willfully and unlawfully kill," of the excepted word, not guilty, of the substituted words, guilty.

Of the Charge: Not guilty, but guilty of a violation of Article 119.

If a court-martial finds an accused guilty of a lesser included offense, the finding as to the charge shall state a violation of the specific punitive article violated and not a violation of Article 79.

(4) Specific lesser included offenses.:

Specific lesser included offenses, if any, are listed for each offense discussed in this Part, but the lists are not all-inclusive.

Article 80—Attempts

4.4.1 a. Text.

"(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically prescribed.

(c) Any person subject to this chapter may be convicted of an attempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial that the offense was consummated."

4.4.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused did a certain overt act;

(2) That the act was done with the specific intent to commit a certain offense under the code;

(3) That the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and

(4) That the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the intended offense.

4.4.3 c. Explanation.
(1) In general. To constitute an attempt there must be a specific intent to commit the offense accompanied by an overt act which directly tends to accomplish the unlawful purpose.

(2) More than preparation. Preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The overt act required goes beyond preparatory steps and is a direct movement toward the commission of the offense. For example, a purchase of matches with the intent to burn a haystack is not an attempt to commit arson, but it is an attempt to commit arson to applying a burning match to a haystack, even if no fire results. The overt act need not be the last act essential to the consummation of the offense. For example, an accused could commit an overt act, and then voluntarily decide not to go through with the intended offense. An attempt would nevertheless have been committed, for the combination of a specific intent to commit an offense, plus the commission of an overt act directly tending to accomplish it, constitutes the offense of attempt. Failure to complete the offense, whatever the cause, is not a defense.

(3) Factual impossibility. A person who purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances were as that person believed them to be is guilty of an attempt. For example, if A, without justification or excuse and with intent to kill B, points a gun at B and pulls the trigger, A is guilty of attempt to murder, even though, unknown to A, the gun is defective and will not fire. Similarly, a person who reaches into the pocket of another with the intent to steal that person's billfold is guilty of an attempt to commit larceny, even though the pocket is empty.

(4) Voluntary abandonment. It is a defense to an attempt offense that the person voluntarily and completely abandoned the intended crime, solely because of the person's own sense that it was wrong, prior to the completion of the crime. The voluntary abandonment defense is not allowed if the abandonment results, in whole or in part, from other reasons, for example, the person feared detection or apprehension, decided to await a better opportunity for success, was unable to complete the crime, or encountered unanticipated difficulties or unexpected resistance. A person who is entitled to the defense of voluntary abandonment may nonetheless be guilty of a lesser included, completed offense. For example, a person who voluntarily abandoned an attempted armed robbery may nonetheless be guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon.

(5) Solicitation. Soliciting another to commit an offense does not constitute an attempt. See paragraph 6 for a discussion of article 82, solicitation.

(6) Attempts not under Article 80. While most attempts should be charged under Article 80, the following attempts are specifically addressed by some other article, and should be charged accordingly:

(a) Article 85--desertion

(b) Article 94--mutiny or sedition.

(c) Article 100--subordinate compelling

(d) Article 104--aiding the enemy

(e) Article 106a--espionage

(f) Article 128--assault

(7) Regulations. An attempt to commit conduct which would violate a lawful general order or regulation under Article 92 ( see paragraph 16) should be charged under Article 80. It is not necessary in such cases to prove that the accused intended to violate the order or regulation, but it must be proved that the accused intended to commit the prohibited conduct.

4.4.4 d. Lesser included offenses.
If the accused is charged with an attempt under Article 80, and the offense attempted has a lesser included offense, then the offense of attempting to commit the lesser included offense would ordinarily be a lesser included offense to the charge of attempt. For example, if an accused was charged with attempted larceny, the offense of attempted wrongful appropriation would be a lesser included offense, although it, like the attempted larceny, would be a violation of Article 80.

4.4.5 e. Maximum punishment.
Any person subject to the code who is found guilty of an attempt under Article 80 to commit any offense punishable by the code shall be subject to the same maximum punishment authorized for the commission of the offense attempted, except that in no case shall the death penalty be adjudged, nor shall any mandatory minimum punishment provisions apply; and in no case, other than attempted murder, shall confinement exceeding 20 years be adjudged.

4.4.6 f. Sample specification.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data) did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19 __________ , attempt to (describe offense with sufficient detail to include expressly or by necessary implication every element).

Article 81—Conspiracy

4.5.1 a. Text.
"Any person subject to this chapter who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under this chapter shall, if one or more of the conspirators does an act to effect the object of the conspiracy, be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.5.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused entered into an agreement with one or more persons to commit an offense under the code; and

(2) That, while the agreement continued to exist, and while the accused remained a party to the agreement, the accused or at least one of the co-conspirators performed an overt act for the purpose of bringing about the object of the conspiracy.

4.5.3 c. Explanation.
(1) Co-conspirators. Two or more persons are required in order to have a conspiracy. Knowledge of the identity of co-conspirators and their particular connection with the criminal purpose need not be established. The accused must be subject to the code, but the other co-conspirators need not be. A person may be guilty of conspiracy although incapable of committing the intended offense. For example, a bedridden conspirator may knowingly furnish the car to be used in a robbery. The joining of another conspirator after the conspiracy has been established does not create a new conspiracy or affect the status of the other conspirators. However, the conspirator who joined an existing conspiracy can be convicted of this offense only if, at or after the time of joining the conspiracy, an overt act in furtherance of the object of the agreement is committed.

(2) Agreement. The agreement in a conspiracy need not be in any particular form or manifested in any formal words. It is sufficient if the minds of the parties arrive at a common understanding to accomplish the object of the conspiracy, and this may be shown by the conduct of the parties. The agreement need not state the means by which the conspiracy is to be accomplished or what part each conspirator is to play.

(3) Object of the agreement. The object of the agreement must, at least in part, involve the commission of one or more offenses under the code. An agreement to commit several offenses is ordinarily but a single conspiracy. Some offenses require two or more culpable actors acting in concert. There can be no conspiracy where the agreement exists only between the persons necessary to commit such an offense. Examples include dueling, bigamy, incest, adultery, and bribery.

(4) Overt act.

(a) The overt act must be independent of the agreement to commit the offense; must take place at the time of or after the agreement; must be done by one or more of the conspirators, but not necessarily the accused; and must be done to effectuate the object of the agreement.

(b) The overt act need not be in itself criminal, but it must be a manifestation that the agreement is being executed. Although committing the intended offense may constitute the overt act, it is not essential that the object offense be committed. Any overt act is enough, no matter how preliminary or preparatory in nature, as long as it is a manifestation that the agreement is being executed.

(c) An overt act by one conspirator becomes the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act and each conspirator is equally guilty even though each does not participate in, or have knowledge of, all of the details of the execution of the conspiracy.

(5) Liability for offenses. Each conspirator is liable for all offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy by any of the co-conspirators while the conspiracy continues and the person remains a party to it.

(6) Withdrawal. A party to the conspiracy who abandons or withdraws from the agreement to commit the offense before the commission of an overt act by any conspirator is not guilty of conspiracy. An effective withdrawal or abandonment must consist of affirmative conduct which is wholly inconsistent with adherence to the unlawful agreement and which shows that the party has severed all connection with the conspiracy. A conspirator who effectively abandons or withdraws from the conspiracy after the performance of an overt act by one of the conspirators remains guilty of conspiracy and of any offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy up to the time of the abandonment or withdrawal. However, a person who has abandoned or withdrawn from the conspiracy is not liable for offenses committed thereafter by the remaining conspirators. The withdrawal of a conspirator from the conspiracy does not affect the status of the remaining members.

(7) Factual impossibility. It is not a defense that the means adopted by the conspirators to achieve their object, if apparently adapted to that end, were actually not capable of success, or that the conspirators were not physically able to accomplish their intended object.

(8) Conspiracy as a separate offense. A conspiracy to commit an offense is a separate and distinct offense from the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, and both the conspiracy and the consummated offense which was its object may be charged, tried, and punished. The commission of the intended offense may also constitute the overt act which is an element of the conspiracy to commit that offense.

(9) Special conspiracies under Article 134. The United Federated Planets Code prohibits conspiracies to commit certain specific offenses which do not require an overt act. These conspiracies should be charged under Article 134. Examples include conspiracies to impede or injure any Federal officer in the discharge of duties under 18 U.F.P.C. § 372, conspiracies against civil rights under 18 U.F.P..C. § 241, and certain drug conspiracies under 21 U.F.P.C. § 846. See paragraph 60c(4)(c)(ii).

4.5.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80--attempts

4.5.5 e. Maximum punishment.
Any person subject to the code who is found guilty of conspiracy shall be subject to the maximum punishment authorized for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, except that in no case shall the death penalty be imposed.

4.5.6 f. Sample specification.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19 __________ , conspire with __________ (and __________ ) to commit an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to wit: (larceny of __________ , of a value of (about) $ __________ , the property of __________ ), and in order to effect the object of the conspiracy the said __________ (and __________ ) did __________ .

Article 82—Solicitation

4.6.1 a. Text.

"(a) Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or advises another or other to desert in violation of section 885 of this title (Article 85) or mutiny in violation of section 894 of this title (Article 94) shall, if the offense solicited or advised is attempted or committed, be punished with the punishment provided for the commission of the offense, but, if the offense solicited or advised is not committed or attempted, he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or advises another or others to commit an act of misbehavior before the enemy in violation of section 899 of this title (Article 99) or sedition in violation of section 894 of this title (Article 94) shall, if the offense solicited or advised is committed, be punished with the punishment provided for the commission of the offense, but, if the offense solicited or advised is not committed, he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.6.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused solicited or advised a certain person or persons to commit any of the four offenses named in Article 82; and

(2) That the accused did so with the intent that the offense actually be committed.

[Note: If the offense solicited or advised was attempted or committed, add the following element]

(3) That the offense solicited or advised was (committed) (attempted) as the proximate result of the solicitation.

4.6.3 c. Explanation.
(1) Instantaneous offense. The offense is complete when a solicitation is made or advice is given with the specific wrongful intent to influence another or others to commit any of the four offenses named in Article 82. It is not necessary that the person or persons solicited or advised agree to or act upon the solicitation or advice.

(2) Form of solicitation. Solicitation may be by means other than word of mouth or writing. Any act or conduct which reasonably may be construed as a serious request or advice to commit one of the four offenses named in Article 82 may constitute solicitation. It is not necessary that the accused act alone in the solicitation or in the advising; the accused may act through other persons in committing this offense.

(3) Solicitations in violation of Article 134. Solicitation to commit offenses other than violations of the four offenses named in Article 82 may be charged as violations of Article 134. See paragraph 105. However, some offenses require, as an element of proof, some act of solicitation by the accused. These offenses are separate and distinct from solicitations under Articles 82 and 134. When the accused's act of solicitation constitutes, by itself, a separate offense, the accused should be charged with that separate, distinct offense--for example, pandering ( see paragraph 97) and obstruction of justice ( see paragraph 96) in violation of Article 134.

4.6.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80--attempts

4.6.5 e. Maximum punishment.
If the offense solicited or advised is committed or (in the case of soliciting desertion or mutiny) attempted, then the accused shall be punished with the punishment provided for the commission of the offense solicited or advised. If the offense solicited or advised is not committed or (in the case of soliciting desertion or mutiny) attempted, then the following punishment may be imposed:

(1) To desert--Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 years.

(2) To mutiny--Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years.

(3) To commit an act of misbehavior before the enemy--Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years.

(4) To commit an act of sedition--Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years.

4.6.6 f. Sample specifications.
(1) For soliciting desertion (Article 85) or mutiny (Article 94).:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) by (here state the manner and form of solicitation or advice), (solicit) (advise) __________ (and __________ ) to (desert in violation of Article 85) (mutiny in violation of Article 94)

[ Note: If the offense solicited or advised is attempted or committed, add the following at the end of the specification:]

and, as a result of such (solicitation) (advice), the offense (solicited) (advised) was, on or about __________ , 19 __________ , (at/on board--location), (attempted) (committed) by __________ (and __________ ).

(2) For soliciting an act of misbehavior before the enemy (Article 99) or sedition (Article 94).:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data) did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) by (here state the manner and form of solicitation or advice), (solicit) (advise), __________ (and __________ ) to commit (an act of misbehavior before the enemy in violation of Article 99) (sedition in violation of Article 94)

[ Note: If the offense solicited or advised is committed, add the following at the end of the specification:]

and, as a result of such (solicitation) (advice), the offense (solicited) (advised) was, on or about __________ 19 __________ , (at/on board--location), committed by __________ (and __________ ).

Article 83—Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation

4.7.1 a. Text.

"Any person who--

(1) procures his own enlistment or appointment in the armed forces by knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment as to his qualifications for that enlistment or appointment and receives pay or allowances there under; or

(2) procures his own separation from the armed forces by knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment as to his eligibility for that separation;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.7.2 b. Elements.
(1) Fraudulent enlistment or appointment.:

(a) That the accused was enlisted or appointed in an armed force;

(b) That the accused knowingly misrepresented or deliberately concealed a certain material fact or facts regarding qualifications of the accused for enlistment or appointment;

(c) That the accused's enlistment or appointment was obtained or procured by that knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment; and

(d) That under this enlistment or appointment that accused received pay or allowances or both.

(2) Fraudulent separation.:

(a) That the accused was separated from an armed force;

(b) That the accused knowingly misrepresented or deliberately concealed a certain material fact or facts about the accused's eligibility for separation; and

(c) That the accused's separation was obtained or procured by that knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment.

4.7.3 c. Explanation.
(1) In general.:

A fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation is one procured by either a knowingly false representation as to any of the qualifications prescribed by law, regulation, or orders for the specific enlistment, appointment, or separation, or a deliberate concealment as to any of those disqualifications. Matters that may be material to an enlistment, appointment, or separation include any information used by the recruiting, appointing, or separating officer in reaching a decision as to enlistment, appointment, or separation in any particular case, and any information that normally would have been so considered had it been provided to that officer.

(2) Receipt of pay or allowances.:

A member of the armed forces who enlists or accepts an appointment without being regularly separated from a prior enlistment or appointment should be charged under Article 83 only if that member has received pay or allowances under the fraudulent enlistment or appointment. Acceptance of food, clothing, shelter, or transportation from the government constitutes receipt of allowances. However, whatever is furnished the accused while in custody, confinement, arrest, or other restraint pending trial for fraudulent enlistment or appointment is not considered an allowance. The receipt of pay or allowances may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(3) One offense.:

One who procures one's own enlistment, appointment, or separation by several misrepresentations or concealment as to qualifications for the one enlistment, appointment, or separation so procured, commits only one offense under Article 83.

4.7.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80--attempts

4.7.5 e. Maximum punishment.
(1) Fraudulent enlistment or appointment.:

Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years.

(2) Fraudulent separation.:

Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.

4.7.6 f. Sample specifications.
(1) For fraudulent enlistment or appointment.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , by means of (knowingly false representations that (here state the fact or facts material to qualification for enlistment or appointment which were represented), when in fact (here state the true fact of facts)) (deliberate concealment of the fact that (here state the fact or facts disqualifying the accused for enlistment or appointment which were concealed)), procure himself/herself to be (enlisted as a __________ ) (appointed as a __________ ) in the (here state the armed force in which the accused procured the enlistment or appointment), and did thereafter, (at/on board--location), receive (pay) (allowances) (pay and allowances) under the enlistment) (appointment) so procured.

(2) For fraudulent separation.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , by means of (knowingly false representations that (here state the fact or facts material to eligibility for separation which were represented), when in fact (here state the true fact or facts)) (deliberate concealment of the fact that (here state the fact or facts concealed which made the accused ineligible for separation)), procure himself/herself to be separated from the (here state the armed force from which the accused procured his/her separation).

Article 84—Effecting unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation

4.8.1 a. Text.

"Any person subject to this chapter who effects an enlistment or appointment in or a separation from the armed forces of any person who is known to him to be ineligible for that enlistment, appointment, or separation because it is prohibited by law, regulation, or order shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.8.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused effected the enlistment, appointment, or separation of the person named;

(2) That this person was ineligible for this enlistment, appointment, or separation because it was prohibited by law, regulation, or order; and

(3) That the accused knew of the ineligibility at the time of the enlistment, appointment, or separation.

4.8.3 c. Explanation.
It must be proved that the enlistment, appointment, or separation was prohibited by law, regulation, or order when effected and that the accused then knew that the person enlisted, appointed, or separated was ineligible for the enlistment, appointment, or separation.

4.8.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80--attempts

4.8.5 e. Maximum punishment.
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.

4.8.6 f. Sample specification.


In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , effect (the (enlistment) (appointment) of __________ as a __________ in (here state the armed force in which the person was enlisted or appointed)) (the separation of __________ from (here state the armed force from which the person was separated)), then well knowing that the said __________ was ineligible for such (enlistment) (appointment) (separation) because (here state facts whereby the enlistment, appointment, or separation was prohibited by law, regulation, or order).

Article 85—Desertion

4.9.1 a. Text.

"(a) Any member of the armed forces who--

(1) without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away there from permanently;

(2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or

(3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another one of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United Federated Planets

[Note: This provision has been held not to state a separate offense by the United Federated Planets Court of Military Appeals in United Federated Planets v. Huff, 7 U.F.P.C.M.A. 247, 22 C.M.R. 37 (1956)];

is guilty of desertion.

(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain away there from permanently is guilty of desertion.

(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct."

4.9.2 b. Elements.
(1) Desertion with intent to remain away permanently.

(a) That the accused absented himself or herself from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty;

(b) That such absence was without authority;

(c) That the accused, at the time the absence began or at some time during the absence, intended to remain away from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty permanently; and

(d) That the accused remained absent until the date alleged.

[Note: If the absence was terminated by apprehension, add the following element]

(e) That the accused's absence was terminated by apprehension.

(2) Desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service.

(a) That the accused quit his or her unit, organization, or other place of duty;

(b) That the accused did so with the intent to avoid a certain duty or shirk a certain service;

(c) That the duty to be performed was hazardous or the service important;

(d) That the accused knew that he or she would be required for such duty or service; and

(e) That the accused remained absent until the date alleged.

(3) Desertion before notice of acceptance of resignation.

(a) That the accused was a commissioned officer of an armed force of the United Federated Planets, and had tendered his or her resignation;

(b) That before he or she received notice of the acceptance of the resignation, the accused quit his or her post or proper duties;

(c) That the accused did so with the intent to remain away permanently from his or her post or proper duties; and

(d) That the accused remained absent until the date alleged.

[Note: If the absence was terminated by apprehension, add the following element]

(e) That the accused's absence was terminated by apprehension.

(4) Attempted desertion.

(a) That the accused did a certain overt act;

(b) That the act was done with the specific intent to desert;

(c) That the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and

(d) That the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the offense of desertion.

4.9.3 c. Explanation.
(1) Desertion with intent to remain away permanently.:

(a) In general.:

Desertion with intent to remain away permanently is complete when the person absents himself or herself without authority from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty, with the intent to remain away there from permanently. A prompt repentance and return, while material in extenuation, is no defense. It is not necessary that the person be absent entirely from military jurisdiction and control.

(b) Absence without authority--inception, duration, termination. See paragraph 10c.

(c) Intent to remain away permanently.:

(i) The intent to remain away permanently from the unit, organization, or place of duty may be formed any time during the unauthorized absence. The intent need not exist throughout the absence, or for any particular period of time, as long as it exists at some time during the absence.

(ii) The accused must have intended to remain away permanently from the unit, organization, or place of duty. When the accused had such an intent, it is no defense that the accused also intended to report for duty elsewhere, or to enlist or accept an appointment in the same or a different armed force.

(iii) The intent to remain away permanently may be established by circumstantial evidence. Among the circumstances from which an inference may be drawn that an accused intended to remain absent permanently or; that the period of absence was lengthy; that the accused attempted to, or did, dispose of uniforms or other military property; that the accused purchased a ticket for a distant point or was arrested, apprehended, or surrendered a considerable distance from the accused's station; that the accused could have conveniently surrendered to military control but did not; that the accused was dissatisfied with the accused's unit, ship, or with military service; that the accused made remarks indicating an intention to desert; that the accused was under charges or had escaped from confinement at the time of the absence; that the accused made preparations indicative of an intent not to return (for example, financial arrangements); or that the accused enlisted or accepted an appointment in the same or another armed force without disclosing the fact that the accused had not been regularly separated, or entered any foreign armed service without being authorized by the United Federated Planets. On the other hand, the following are included in the circumstances which may tend to negate an inference that the accused intended to remain away permanently: previous long and excellent service; that the accused left valuable personal property in the unit or on the ship; or that the accused was under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the absence. These lists are illustrative only.

(iv) Entries on documents, such as personnel accountability records, which administratively refer to an accused as a "deserter" are not evidence of intent to desert.

(v) Proof of, or a plea of guilty to, an unauthorized absence, even of extended duration, does not, without more, prove guilt of desertion.

(d) Effect of enlistment or appointment in the same or a different armed force.:

Article 85a(3) does not state a separate offense. Rather, it is a rule of evidence by which the prosecution may prove intent to remain away permanently. Proof of an enlistment or acceptance of an appointment in a service without disclosing a preexisting duty status in the same or a different service provides the basis from which an inference of intent to permanently remain away from the earlier unit, organization, or place of duty may be drawn. Furthermore, if a person, without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces, enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another armed force, the person's presence in the military service under such an enlistment or appointment is not a return to military control and does not terminate any desertion or absence without authority from the earlier unit or organization, unless the facts of the earlier period of service are known to military authorities. If a person, while in desertion, enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another armed force, and deserts while serving the enlistment or appointment, the person may be tried and convicted for each desertion.

(2) Quitting unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service.:

(a) Hazardous duty or important service.:

"Hazardous duty" or "important service" may include service such as duty in a combat or other dangerous area; embarkation for certain foreign or sea duty; movement to a port of embarkation for that purpose; entrainment for duty on the border or coast in time of war or threatened invasion or other disturbances; strike or riot duty; or employment in aid of the civil power in, for example, protecting property, or quelling or preventing disorder in times of great public disaster. Such services as drill, target practice, maneuvers, and practice marches are not ordinarily "hazardous duty or important service." Whether a duty is hazardous or a service is important depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and is a question of fact for the court-martial to decide.

(b) Quits. "Quits" in Article 85 means "goes absent without authority."

(c) Actual knowledge. Article 85 a(2) requires proof that the accused actually knew of the hazardous duty or important service. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(3) Attempting to desert.:

Once the attempt is made, the fact that the person desists, voluntarily or otherwise, does not cancel the offense. The offense is complete, for example, if the person, intending to desert, hides in an empty freight car on a military reservation, intending to escape by being taken away in the car. Entering the car with the intent to desert is the overt act. For a more detailed discussion of attempts, see paragraph 4. For an explanation concerning intent to remain away permanently, see subparagraph 9c(1)(c).

(4) Prisoner with executed punitive discharge.:

A prisoner whose dismissal or dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge has been executed is not a "member of the armed forces" within the meaning of Articles 85 or 86, although the prisoner may still be subject to military law under Article 2( a)(7). If the facts warrant, such a prisoner could be charged with escape from confinement under Article 95 or an offense under Article 134.

4.9.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 86--absence without leave

4.9.5 e. Maximum punishment.
(1) Completed or attempted desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.

(2) Other cases of completed or attempted desertion.

(a) Terminated by apprehension. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 years.

(b) Terminated otherwise. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years.

(3) In time of war. Death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

4.9.6 f. Sample specifications.
(1) Desertion with intent to remain away permanently.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) without authority and with intent to remain away there from permanently, absent himself/herself from his/her (unit) (organization) (place of duty), to wit: __________ , located at ( __________ ), and did remain so absent in desertion until (he/she was apprehended) on or about __________ 19 __________ .

(2) Desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty or shirk important service.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) with intent to (avoid hazardous duty) (shirk important service), namely: __________ , quit his/her (unit) (organization) (place of duty), to wit: __________ , located at ( __________ ), and did remain so absent in desertion until on or about __________ 19 __________ .

(3) Desertion prior to acceptance of resignation.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data) having tendered his/her resignation and prior to due notice of the acceptance of the same, did, on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) without leave and with intent to remain away there from permanently, quit his/her (post) (proper duties), to wit: __________ , and did remain so absent in desertion until (he/she was apprehended) on or about __________ 19 __________ .

(4) Attempted desertion.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board-location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) attempt to (absent himself/herself from his/her (unit) (organization) (place of duty) to wit: __________ , without authority and with intent to remain away there from permanently) (quit his/her (unit) (organization) (place of duty), to wit: __________ , located at __________ , with intent to (avoid hazardous duty) (shirk important service) namely __________ ) ( __________ ).

Article 86 - Absence without leave (AWOL)

4.10.1 a. Text.

"Any member of the armed forces who, without authority--

(1) fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the time prescribed;

(2) goes from that place; or

(3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty at which he is required to be at the time prescribed; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.10.2 b. Elements.
(1) Failure to go to appointed place of duty.:

(a) That a certain authority appointed a certain time and place of duty for the accused;

(b) That the accused knew of that time and place; and

(c) That the accused, without authority, failed to go to the appointed place of duty at the time prescribed.

(2) Going from appointed place of duty.:

(a) That a certain authority appointed a certain time and place of duty for the accused;

(b) That the accused knew of that time and place; and

(c) That the accused, without authority, went from the appointed place of duty after having reported at such place.

(3) Absence from unit, organization, or place of duty.:

(a) That the accused absented himself or herself from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty at which he or she was required to be;

(b) That the absence was without authority from anyone competent to give him or her leave; and

(c) That the absence was for a certain period of time.

[Note: if the absence was terminated by apprehension, add the following element]

(d) That the absence was terminated by apprehension.

(4) Abandoning watch or guard.:

(a) That the accused was a member of a guard, watch, or duty;

(b) That the accused absented himself or herself from his or her guard, watch, or duty section;

(c) That absence of the accused was without authority; and

[Note: If the absence was with intent to abandon the accused's guard, watch, or duty section, add the following element]

(d) That the accused intended to abandon his or her guard, watch, or duty section.

(5) Absence from unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid maneuvers or field exercises.:

(a) That the accused absented himself or herself from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty at which he or she was required to be;

(b) That the absence of the accused was without authority;

(c) That the absence was for a certain period of time;

(d) That the accused knew that the absence would occur during a part of a period of maneuvers or field exercises; and

(e) That the accused intended to avoid all or part of a period of maneuvers or field exercises.

4.10.3 c. Explanation.
(1) In general. This article is designed to cover every case not elsewhere provided for in which any member of the armed forces is through the member's own fault not at the place where the member is required to be at a prescribed time. It is not necessary that the person be absent entirely from military jurisdiction and control. The first part of this article--relating to the appointed place of duty--applies whether the place is appointed as a rendezvous for several or for one only.

(2) Actual knowledge. The offenses of failure to go to and going from appointed place of duty require proof that the accused actually knew of the appointed time and place of duty. The offense of absence from unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid maneuvers or field exercises requires proof that the accused actually knew that the absence would occur during a part of a period of maneuvers or field exercises. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(3) Intent. Specific intent is not an element of unauthorized absence. Specific intent is an element for certain aggravated unauthorized absences.

(4) Aggravated forms of unauthorized absence. There are variations of unauthorized absence under Article 86(3) which are more serious because of aggravating circumstances such as duration of the absence, a special type of duty from which the accused absents himself or herself, and a particular specific intent which accompanies the absence. These circumstances are not essential elements of a violation of Article 86. They simply constitute special matters in aggravation. The following are aggravated unauthorized absences:

(a) Unauthorized absence for more than 3 days (duration).

(b) Unauthorized absence for more than 30 days (duration).

(c) Unauthorized absence from a guard, watch, or duty (special type of duty).

(d) Unauthorized absence from guard, watch, or duty section with the intent to abandon it (special type of duty and specific intent).

(e) Unauthorized absence with the intent to avoid maneuvers or field exercises (special type of duty and specific intent).

(5) Control by civilian authorities. A member of the armed forces turned over to the civilian authorities upon request under Article 14 ( see R.C.M. 106) is not absent without leave while held by them under that delivery. When a member of the armed forces, being absent with leave, or absent without leave, is held, tried, and acquitted by civilian authorities, the member's status as absent with leave, or absent without leave, is not thereby changed, regardless how long held. The fact that a member of the armed forces is convicted by the civilian authorities, or adjudicated to be a juvenile offender, or the case is "diverted" out of the regular criminal process for a probationary period does not excuse any unauthorized absence, because the member's inability to return was the result of willful misconduct. If a member is released by the civilian authorities without trial, and was on authorized leave at the time of arrest or detention, the member may be found guilty of unauthorized absence only if it is proved that the member actually committed the offense for which detained, thus establishing that the absence was the result of the member's own misconduct.

(6) Inability to return. The status of absence without leave is not changed by an inability to return through sickness, lack of transportation facilities, or other disabilities. But the fact that all or part of a period of unauthorized absence was in a sense enforced or involuntary is a factor in extenuation and should be given due weight when considering the initial disposition of the offense. When, however, a person on authorized leave, without fault, is unable to return at the expiration thereof, that person has not committed the offense of absence without leave.

(7) Determining the unit or organization of an accused. A person undergoing transfer between activities is ordinarily considered to be attached to the activity to which ordered to report. A person on temporary additional duty continues as a member of the regularly assigned unit and if the person is absent from the temporary duty assignment, the person becomes absent without leave from both units, and may be charged with being absent without leave from either unit.

(8) Duration. Unauthorized absence under Article 86(3) is an instantaneous offense. It is complete at the instant an accused absents himself or herself without authority. Duration of the absence is a matter in aggravation for the purpose of increasing the maximum punishment authorized for the offense. Even if the duration of the absence is not over 3 days, it is ordinarily alleged in an Article 86(3) specification. If the duration is not alleged or if alleged but not proved, an accused can be convicted of and punished for only 1 day of unauthorized absence.

(9) Computation of duration. In computing the duration of an unauthorized absence, any one continuous period of absence found that totals not more than 24 hours is counted as 1 day; any such period that totals more than 24 hours and not more than 48 hours is counted as 2 days, and so on. The hours of departure and return on different dates are assumed to be the same if not alleged and proved. For example, if an accused is found guilty of unauthorized absence from 0600 hours, 4 April, to 1000 hours, 7 April of the same year (76 hours), the maximum punishment would be based on an absence of 4 days. However, if the accused is found guilty simply of unauthorized absence from 4 April to 7 April, the maximum punishment would be based on an absence of 3 days.

(10) Termination--methods of return to military control.

(a) Surrender to military authority. A surrender occurs when a person presents himself or herself to any military authority, whether or not a member of the same armed force, notifies that authority of his or her unauthorized absence status, and submits or demonstrates a willingness to submit to military control. Such a surrender terminates the unauthorized absence.

(b) Apprehension by military authority. Apprehension by military authority of a known absentee terminates an unauthorized absence.

(c) Delivery to military authority. Delivery of a known absentee by anyone to military authority terminates the unauthorized absence.

(d) Apprehension by civilian authorities at the request of the military. When an absentee is taken into custody by civilian authorities at the request of military authorities, the absence is terminated.

(e) Apprehension by civilian authorities without prior military request. When an absentee is in the hands of civilian authorities for other reasons and these authorities make the absentee available for return to military control, the absence is terminated when the military authorities are informed of the absentee's availability.

(11) Findings of more than one absence under one specification. An accused may properly be found guilty of two or more separate unauthorized absences under one specification, provided that each absence is included within the period alleged in the specification and provided that the accused was not misled. If an accused is found guilty of two or more unauthorized absences under a single specification, the maximum authorized punishment shall not exceed that authorized if the accused had been found guilty as charged in the specification.

4.10.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80--attempts

4.10.5 e. Maximum punishment.
(1) Failing to go to, or going from, the appointed place of duty. Confinement for 1 month and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 1 month.

(2) Absence from unit, organization, or other place of duty.

(a) For not more than 3 days. Confinement for 1 month and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 1 month.

(b) For more than 3 days but not more than 30 days. Confinement for 6 months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 6months.

(c) For more than 30 days. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.

(d) For more than 30 days and terminated by apprehension. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 18 months.

(3) From guard or watch. Confinement for 3 months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 3 months.

(4) From guard or watch with intent to abandon. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 months.

(5) With intent to avoid maneuvers or field exercises. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 months.

4.10.6 f. Sample specifications.

(1) Failing to go or leaving place of duty.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , without authority, (fail to go at the time prescribed to) (go from) his/her appointed place of duty, to wit: (here set forth the appointed place of duty).

(2) Absence from unit, organization, or place of duty.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, on or about __________ 19 __________ , without authority, absent himself/herself from his/her (unit) (organization) (place of duty at which he/she was required to be), to wit: __________ , located at __________ , and did remain so absent until (he/she was

apprehended) on or about __________ 19 __________ .

(3) Absence from unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid maneuvers or field exercises.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, on or about __________ 19 __________ , without authority and with intent to avoid (maneuvers) (field exercises), absent himself/herself from his/her (unit) (organization) (place of duty at which he/she was required to be), to wit: __________ located at ( __________ ), and did remain so absent until on or about __________ 19 __________ .

(4) Abandoning watch or guard.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), being a member of the __________ (guard) (watch) (duty section), did, (at/on board-location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , without authority, go from his/her (guard) (watch) (duty section) (with intent to abandon the same).

Article 87 - Missing movement

4.11.1 a. Text.

"Any person subject to this chapter who through neglect or design misses the movement of a ship, aircraft, or unit with which he is required in the course of duty to move shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.11.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused was required in the course of duty to move with a ship, aircraft or unit;

(2) That the accused knew of the prospective movement of the ship, aircraft or unit;

(3) That the accused missed the movement of the ship, aircraft or unit; and

(4) That the accused missed the movement through design or neglect.

4.11.3 c. Explanation.
(1) Movement. "Movement" as used in Article 87 includes a move, transfer, or shift of a ship, aircraft, or unit involving a substantial distance and period of time. Whether a particular movement is substantial is a question to be determined by the court-martial considering all the circumstances. Changes which do not constitute a "movement" include practice marches of a short duration with a return to the point of departure, and minor changes in location of ships, aircraft, or units, as when a ship is shifted from one berth to another in the same shipyard or harbor or when a unit is moved from one barracks to another on the same post.

(2) Mode of movement.

(a) Unit. If a person is required in the course of duty to move with a unit, the mode of travel is not important, whether it be military or commercial, and includes travel by ship, train, aircraft, truck, bus, or walking. The word "unit" is not limited to any specific technical category such as those listed in a table of organization and equipment, but also includes units which are created before the movement with the intention that they have organizational continuity upon arrival at their destination regardless of their technical designation, and units intended to be disbanded upon arrival at their destination.

(b) Ship, aircraft. If a person is assigned as a crew member or is ordered to move as a passenger aboard a particular ship or aircraft, military or chartered, then missing the particular sailing or flight is essential to establish the offense of missing movement.

(3) Design. "Design" means on purpose, intentionally, or according to plan and requires specific intent to miss the movement.

(4) Neglect. "Neglect" means the omission to take such measures as are appropriate under the circumstances to assure presence with a ship, aircraft, or unit at the time of a scheduled movement, or doing some act without giving attention to its probable consequences in connection with the prospective movement, such as a departure from the vicinity of the prospective movement to such a distance as would make it likely that one could not return in time for the movement.

(5) Actual knowledge. In order to be guilty of the offense, the accused must have actually known of the prospective movement that was missed. Knowledge of the exact hour or even of the exact date of the scheduled movement is not required. It is sufficient if the approximate date was known by the accused as long as there is a causal connection between the conduct of the accused and the missing of the scheduled movement. Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(6) Proof of absence. That the accused actually missed the movement may be proved by documentary evidence, as by a proper entry in a log or a morning report. This fact may also be proved by the testimony of personnel of the ship, aircraft, or unit (or by other evidence) that the movement occurred at a certain time, together with evidence that the accused was physically elsewhere at that time.

4.11.4 d. Lesser included offenses.
(1) Design.

(a) Article 87--missing movement through neglect

(b) Article 86--absence without authority

(c) Article 80--attempts

(2) Neglect. Article 86--absence without authority

4.11.5 e. Maximum punishment.

(1) Design. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years.

(2) Neglect. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.

4.11.6 f. Sample specification.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , through (neglect) (design) miss the movement of (Aircraft No. __________ ) (Flight __________ ) (the USS __________ ) (Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry) ( __________ ) with which he/she was required in the course of duty to move.

Article 88 - Contempt toward officials

4.12.1 a. Text.

"Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.12.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused was a commissioned officer of the United Federated Planets armed forces;

(2) That the accused used certain words against an official or legislature named in the article;

(3) That by an act of the accused these words came to the knowledge of a person other than the accused; and

(4) That the words used were contemptuous, either in themselves or by virtue of the circumstances under which they were used.

[Note: If the words were against a Governor or legislature, add the following element]

(5) That the accused was then present in the State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession of the Governor or legislature concerned.

4.12.3 c. Explanation.
The official or legislature against whom the words are used must be occupying one of the offices or be one of the legislatures named in Article 88 at the time of the offense. Neither "Congress" nor "legislature" includes its members individually. "Governor" does not include "lieutenant governor." It is immaterial whether the words are used against the official in an official or private capacity. If not personally contemptuous, adverse criticism of one of the officials or legislatures named in the article in the course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, may not be charged as a violation of the article. Similarly, expressions of opinion made in a purely private conversation should not ordinarily be charged. Giving broad circulation to a written publication containing contemptuous words of the kind made punishable by this article, or the utterance of contemptuous words of this kind in the presence of military subordinates, aggravates the offense. The truth or falsity of the statements is immaterial.

4.12.4 d. Lesser included offense.
Article 80--attempts

4.12.5 e. Maximum punishment.
Dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.

4.12.6 f. Sample specification.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , [use (orally and publicly) ( __________ ) the following contemptuous words] [in a contemptuous manner, use (orally and publicly) ( __________ ) the following words] against the [(President) (Vice President) (Congress) (Secretary of __________ )] [(Governor) (legislature) of the (State of __________ ) (Territory of __________ ) ( __________ ), a (State) (Territory) ( __________ ) in which he/she, the said ________ , was then (on duty), (present)], to wit: "__________," or words to that effect.

Article 89 - Disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer

4.13.1 a. Text.

"Any person subject to this chapter who behaves with disrespect toward his superior commissioned officer shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.13.2 b. Elements.
(1) That the accused did or omitted certain acts or used certain language to or concerning a certain commissioned officer;

(2) That such behavior or language was directed toward that officer;

(3) That the officer toward whom the acts, omissions, or words were directed was the superior commissioned officer of the accused;

(4) That the accused then knew that the commissioned officer toward whom the acts, omissions, or words were directed was the accused's superior commissioned officer; and

(5) That, under the circumstances, the behavior or language was disrespectful to that commissioned officer.

4.13.3 c. Explanation.
(1) Superior commissioned officer.

(a) Accused and victim in same armed force. If the accused and the victim are in the same armed force, the victim is a "superior commissioned officer" of the accused when either superior in rank or command to the accused; however, the victim is not a "superior commissioned officer” of the accused if the victim is inferior in command, even though superior in rank.

(b) Accused and victim in different armed forces. If the accused and the victim are in different armed forces, the victim is a "superior commissioned officer" of the accused when the victim is a commissioned officer and superior in the chain of command over the accused or when the victim, not a medical officer or a chaplain, is senior in grade to the accused and both are detained by a hostile entity so that recourse to the normal chain of command is prevented. The victim is not a "superior commissioned officer" of the accused merely because the victim is superior in grade to the accused.

(c) Execution of office. It is not necessary that the "superior commissioned officer" be in the execution of office at the time of the disrespectful behavior.

(2) Knowledge. If the accused did not know that the person against whom the acts or words were directed was the accused's superior commissioned officer, the accused may not be convicted of a violation of this article. Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(3) Disrespect. Disrespectful behavior is that which detracts from the respect due the authority and person of a superior commissioned officer. It may consist of acts or language, however expressed, and it is immaterial whether they refer to the superior as an officer or as a private individual. Disrespect by words may be conveyed by abusive epithets or other contemptuous or denunciatory language. Truth is no defense. Disrespect by acts includes neglecting the customary salute, or showing a marked disdain, indifference, insolence, impertinence, undue familiarity, or other rudeness in the presence of the superior officer.

(4) Presence. It is not essential that the disrespectful behavior be in the presence of the superior, but ordinarily one should not be held accountable under this article for what was said or done in a purely private conversation.

(5) Special defense--unprotected victim. A superior commissioned officer whose conduct in relation to the accused under all the circumstances departs substantially from the required standards appropriate to that officer's rank or position under similar circumstances loses the protection of this article. That accused may not be convicted of being disrespectful to the officer who has so lost the entitlement to respect protected by Article 89.

4.13.4 d. Lesser included offenses.
(1) Article 117--provoking speeches or gestures

(2) Article 80--attempts

4.13.5 e. Maximum punishment.
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.

4.13.6 f. Sample specification.

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , behave himself/herself with disrespect toward __________ , his/her superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be his/her superior commissioned officer, by (saying to him/her "__________," or words to that effect) (contemptuously turning from and leaving him/her while he/she, the said __________ , was talking to him/her, the said __________ ) ( __________ ).

Article 90 - Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer

4.14.1 a. Text.

"Any person subject to this chapter who--

(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence against him while he is in the execution of his office; or

(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer;

shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct."

4.14.2 b. Elements.
(1) Striking or assaulting superior commissioned officer.:

(a) That the accused struck, drew, or lifted up a weapon against, or offered violence against, a certain commissioned officer;

(b) That the officer was the superior commissioned officer of the accused;

(c) That the accused then knew that the officer was the accused's superior commissioned officer; and

(d) That the superior commissioned officer was then in the execution of office.

(2) Disobeying superior commissioned officer.:

(a) That the accused received a lawful command from a certain commissioned officer;

(b) That this officer was the superior commissioned officer of the accused;

(c) That the accused then knew that this officer was the accused's superior commissioned officer; and

(d) That the accused willfully disobeyed the lawful command.

4.14.3 c. Explanation.
(1) Striking or assaulting superior commissioned officer.:

(a) Definitions.

(i) Superior commissioned officer.:

The definitions in paragraph 13c(1)( a) and( b) apply here and in subparagraph c(2).

(ii) Strikes.:

"Strikes" means an intentional blow, and includes any offensive touching of the person of an officer, however slight.

(iii) Draws or lifts up any weapon against.:

The phrase "draws or lifts up any weapon against" covers any simple assault committed in the manner stated. The drawing of any weapon in an aggressive manner or the raising or brandishing of the same in a threatening manner in the presence of and at the superior is the sort of act proscribed. The raising in a threatening manner of a firearm, whether or not loaded, of a club, or of anything by which a serious blow or injury could be given is included in "lifts up."

(iv) Offers any violence against.:

The phrase "offers any violence against" includes any form of battery or of mere assault not embraced in the preceding more specific terms "strikes" and "draws or lifts up." If not executed, the violence must be physically attempted or menaced. A mere threatening in words is not an offering of violence in the sense of this article.

(b) Execution of office. An officer is in the execution of office when engaged in any act or service required or authorized by treaty, statute, regulation, the order of a superior, or military usage. In general, any striking or use of violence against any superior officer by a person over whom it is the duty of that officer to maintain discipline at the time, would be striking or using violence against the officer in the execution of office. The commanding officer on board a ship or the commanding officer of a unit in the field is generally considered to be on duty at all times.

(c) Knowledge. If the accused did not know the officer was the accused's superior commissioned officer, the accused may not be convicted of this offense. Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(d) Defenses. In a prosecution for striking or assaulting a superior commissioned officer in violation of this article, it is a defense that the accused acted in the proper discharge of some duty, or that the victim behaved in a manner toward the accused such as to lose the protection of this article ( see paragraph 13c(5)). For example, if the victim initiated an unlawful attack on the accused, this would deprive the victim of the protection of this article, and, in addition, could excuse any lesser included offense of assault as done in self-defense, depending on the circumstances ( see paragraph 54c. R.C.M. 916( e)).

(2) Disobeying superior commissioned officer.:

(a) Lawfulness of the order.

(i) Inference of lawfulness.:

An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime.

(ii) Authority of issuing officer.:

The commissioned officer issuing the order must have authority to give such an order. Authorization may be based on law, regulation, or custom of the service.

(iii) Relationship to military duty.:

The order must relate to military duty, which includes all activities reasonably necessary to accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a command and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the service. The order may not, without such a valid military purpose, interfere with private rights or personal affairs. However, the dictates of a person's conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. Disobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under this article.

(iv) Relationship to statutory or constitutional rights.:

The order must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order.

(b) Personal nature of the order. The order must be directed specifically to the subordinate. Violations of regulations, standing orders or directives, or failure to perform previously established duties are not punishable under this article, but may violate Article 92.

(c) Form and transmission of the order. As long as the order is understandable, the form of the order is immaterial, as is the method by which it is transmitted to the accused.

(d) Specificity of the order. The order must be a specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. An exhortation to "obey the law" or to perform one's military duty does not constitute an order under this article.

(e) Knowledge. The accused must have actual knowledge of the order and of the fact that the person issuing the order was the accused's superior commissioned officer. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(f) Nature of the disobedience. "Willful disobedience" is an intentional defiance of authority. Failure to comply with an order through heedlessness, remissness, or forgetfulness is not a violation of this article but may violate Article 92.

(g) Time for compliance. When an order requires immediate compliance, an accused's declared intent not to obey and the failure to make any move to comply constitutes disobedience. If an order does not indicate the time within which it is to be complied with, either expressly or by implication, then a reasonable delay in compliance does not violate this article. If an order requires performance in the future, an accused's present statement of intention to disobey the order does not constitute disobedience of that order, although carrying out that intention may.

(3) Civilians and discharged prisoners.:

A discharged prisoner or other civilian subject to military law ( see Article 2) and under the command of a commissioned officer is subject to the provisions of this article.

4.14.4 d. Lesser included offenses.
(1) Striking superior commissioned officer in execution of office.:

(a) Article 90--drawing or lifting up a weapon or offering violence to superior commissioned officer in execution of office

(b) Article 128--assault; assault consummated by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon

(c) Article 128--assault or assault consummated by a battery upon commissioned officer not in the execution of office

(d) Article 80--attempts

(2) Drawing or lifting up a weapon or offering violence to superior commissioned officer in execution of office.:

(a) Article 128--assault, assault with dangerous weapon

(b) Article 128--assault upon a commissioned officer not in the execution of office

(c) Article 80--attempts

(3) Willfully disobeying lawful order of superior commissioned officer.

(a) Article 92--failure to obey lawful order

(b) Article 89--disrespect to superior commissioned officer

(c) Article 80--attempts

4.14.5 e. Maximum punishment.
(1) Striking, drawing, or lifting up any weapon or offering any violence to superior commissioned officer in the execution of office.:

Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years.

(2) Willfully disobeying a lawful order of superior commissioned officer.:

Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.

(3) In time of war.:

Death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

4.14.6 f. Sample specifications.
(1) Striking superior commissioned officer.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) strike __________ , his/her superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be his/her superior commissioned officer, who was then in the execution of his/her office, (in) (on) the __________ with ( a) (his/her) __________ .

(2) Drawing or lifting up a weapon against superior commissioned officer.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) (draw) lift up) a weapon, to wit: a __________ , against __________ , his/her superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be his/her superior commissioned officer, who was then in the execution of his/her office.

(3) Offering violence to superior commissioned officer.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19 __________ , (a time of war) offer violence against __________ , his/her superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be his/her superior commissioned officer, who was then in the execution of his/her office, by __________ .

(4) Willful disobedience of superior commissioned officer.:

In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), having received a lawful command from __________ , his/her superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be his/her superior commissioned officer, to __________ , or words to that effect, did, (at/on board--location), on or about __________ 19 __________ , willfully disobey the same.

Article 91 - Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer

4.15.1 a. Text.

"Any warrant officer or enlisted member who--

(1) strikes or assaults a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his office;

(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer; or

(3) treats with contempt or is disrespectful in language or deportment toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer while that officer is in the execution of his office; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

4.15.2 b. Elements.
(1) Striking or assaulting warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer.:

(a) That the accused was a warrant officer or enlisted member;

(b) That the accused struck or assaulted a certain warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer;

(c) That the striking or assault was committed while the victim was in the execution of office; and

(d) That the accused then knew that the person struck or assaulted was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer.

[Note: If the victim was the superior noncommissioned or petty officer of the accused, add the following elements]

(e) That the victim was the superior noncommissioned, or petty officer of the accused; and

(f) That the accused then knew that the person struck or assaulted was the accused's superior noncommissioned, or petty officer.

(2) Disobeying a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer.:

(a) That the accused was a warrant officer or enlisted member;

(b) That the accused received a certain lawful order from a certain warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer;

(c) That the accused then knew that the person giving the order was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer;

(d) That the accused had a duty to obey the order; and

(e) That the accused willfully disobeyed the order.

(3) Treating with contempt or being disrespectful in language or deportment toward a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer.:

(a) That the accused was a warrant officer or enlisted member;

(b) That the accused did or omitted certain acts, or used certain language;

(c) That such behavior or language was used toward and within sight or hearing of a certain warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer;

(d) That the accused then knew that the person toward whom the behavior or language was directed was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer;

(e) That the victim was then in the execution of office; and

(f) That under the circumstances the accused, by such behavior or language, treated with contempt or was disrespectful to said warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer.

[Note: If the victim was the superior noncommissioned, or petty officer of the accused, add the following elements]

(g) That the victim was the superior noncommissioned, or petty officer of the accused; and

(h) That the accused then knew that the person toward whom the behavior or language was directed was the accused's superior noncommissioned, or petty officer.

4.15.3 c. Explanation.
(1) In general. Article 91 has the same general objects with respect to warrant, noncommissioned, and petty officers as Articles 89 and 90 have with respect to commissioned officers, namely, to ensure obedience to their lawful orders, and to protect them from violence, insult, or disrespect. Unlike Articles 89 and 90, however, this article does not require a superior-subordinate relationship as an element of any of the offenses denounced. This article does not protect an acting noncommissioned officer or acting petty officer, nor does it protect military police or members of the shore patrol who are not warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officers.

(2) Knowledge. All of the offenses prohibited by Article 91 require that the accused have actual knowledge that the victim was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(3) Striking or assaulting a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer. For a discussion of "strikes" and "in the execution of office," see paragraph 14c. For a discussion of "assault," see paragraph 54c. An assault by a prisoner who has been discharged from the service, or by any other civilian subject to military law, upon a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer should be charged under Article 128 or 134.

(4) Disobeying a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer. See paragraph 14c(2) for a discussion of lawfulness, personal nature, form, transmission, and specificity of the order, nature of the disobedience, and time for compliance with the order.

(5) Treating with contempt or being disrespectful in language or deportment toward a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer. "Toward" requires that the behavior and language be within the sight or hearing of the warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer concerned. For a discussion of "in the execution of his office," see paragraph 14c. For a discussion of disrespect, see paragraph 13c.

4.15.4 d. Lesser included offenses.
(1) Striking or assaulting wa